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Notes
The Meaning of Just Cause for
Termination When an Employer Alleges
Misconduct and the Employee
Denies It
by
MICHAEL D. FABIANo*

Job security is unquestionably one of the greatest concerns of American workers.' Employees in many workplaces today have a substantial
measure of job security in that they are protected from arbitrary dismissal by either an express or an implied promise that they will not be termi-

nated without "just cause" or "good cause." This promise, however, is
often ill-defined, and necessarily so when it is based on an "implied con-

tract" theory.2

* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1986, Rice University; M.S. 1988, University of
California, Berkeley. The author thanks Lisa Ashley, Professor Joseph Grodin, and John True
for their comments on earlier drafts of this Note.
For the convenience of readers who do not have easy access to the Pacific Reporter, parallel citations to the California Supreme Court cases cited in this Note are as follows: Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988); Lagoe v. Duber Indust. Sec.,
Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1989); Rojo v. Klger, 52 Cal.3d 65, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1990).
1. Many recent public opinion surveys have found job security to be at or near the top of
Americans' concerns about their lives. In one recent poll, conducted by the Roper Organization, 73% of the blue-collar workers surveyed and 71% of the white-collar workers surveyed
said their biggest fear was being out of work. James Welsh, People Fullof Worry, Poll Shows,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 15, 1992, at Fl. See also John M. Berry, Consumers'
Pessimism Deepens: Index of Confidence Hits 18-Year Low on Job Loss Fears, WASH. POST,
Feb. 26, 1992, at Al, A12.
2. Most American jurisdictions recognize that the traditional rule of at-will employment
may be modified by promises inferred from the conduct of the parties. See, eg., Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980) (holding that a provision providing that an employee shall not be discharged except for cause can become part of the employment contract by either express or implied agreement); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 924 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that an employer's right to discharge may be limited
by the express or implied terms of the employment agreement); Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 384 (Cal. 1988) (concluding that Pugh correctly applied contract principles in the employment context, and noting a strong trend in other jurisdictions in favor of
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One vexing problem with this lack of definition arises when an employer wants to terminate an employee based on disputed allegations of
wrongdoing. For example, an employer may have received a sketchy report from a co-worker that an employee is regularly stealing valuable
company property. Such a report may be based on rumor, on what the
informant thought she saw, or on the idle observations and deductions of
a busybody. Does this information alone provide a sufficient basis for an
employer to terminate a just-cause protected employee? If not, how
much more weighty or reliable must the information be? Does the answer depend on the nature of the allegations or the nature of the accused
employee's job?
These questions are becoming relevant to increasing numbers of employees and employers. In 1987, Montana became the first and so far the
only state to enact a wrongful discharge statute, which protects covered
employees against discharge without "good cause."' 3 In 1991, the Uniform Law Commissioners adopted a Model Employment Termination
Act, which would provide most nonunion, private-sector employees with
protection against discharge without "good cause."' 4 Several other states,
including California, Illinois, Michigan, and New York, have considered
enacting a statutory reform of employment law that would include protection against termination without cause,5 and numerous commentators
6
have advocated such a step.
Reforms such as these will, in the near future, bring protection
against termination without cause for many employees that currently
may be discharged "at will."'7 It is estimated that 2,000,000 nonprobationary, nonunion, private-sector employees are discharged nationwide
each year, and that of these, about 150,000 to 200,000 would have legitimate legal claims under a just-cause standard.8
recognizing implied contract terms that modify the power of an employer to discharge an
employee at will); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 735 (Ala. 1987) (hold-

ing that provisions in an employee handbook may constitute an offer to create a unilateral
contract that modifies the at-will employment relationship); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (same).
3. MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-904 to -914 (1989).
4. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 3(a) (1991).
5. Two bills that would have provided just-cause protection for many nonunion, privatesector employees were introduced in a recent session of the California Legislature, one supported by several groups of employers and the other backed by the ACLU and AFL-CIO. See
Joseph Grodin, Toward A Wrongful Termination Statutefor California,42 HASTINGS L.J. 135,
141-42 (1990). The prefatory note to the Model Employment Termination Act states that "at
least 14 states... have undertaken to draft and/or consider legislation in this area." MODEL
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT prefatory note (1991).
6. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
For a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) (one of the earliest articles advocating statutory justcause protection).
7. See infra Part I.
8.

MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT prefatory note (1991).
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This Note examines what a nonunion, private-sector employer must
demonstrate-good faith, reasonableness, actual misconduct, or something else-in order to lawfully terminate a just-cause protected employee. In answering this question, the employee's right to the job
security she has been promised must be balanced against the employer's
right to make business decisions and the employer's obligation to ensure
safety in the workplace.

I.

The Distinction Between Just Cause and
At-Will Employment

Under the common law, at-will employment is the default position 9 -any employment relationship is at will unless the parties otherwise modify it. The at-will employment rule has been held to mean that
the relationship is terminable at any time by either party, regardless of
motive, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause, and for any reason or no
reason.10 In California, by statute, employment is presumed to be at will
unless the parties to the relationship provide otherwise. 1
In many workplaces today, however, employees are protected from
at-will termination by either an implied or an express promise that their
employer will not dismiss them except for good cause. Some form of
just-cause protection is written into almost every collective bargaining
agreement,12 and nearly all civil service systems have just-cause
9. See HENRY H. PERRrrT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTIcE § 1.1 (3d
ed. 1992 & Supp. 1992).
10. Payne v. Western & Ati. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
11. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
12. A recent study of 400 collective bargaining agreements found that "cause" or "just
cause" was stated as grounds for discharge in 86% of the agreements studied. BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTs 7 (12th ed. 1989).
The actual clauses may vary widely from contract to contract. The following example
appeared in a paper industry collective bargaining agreement:
It is agreed that warning, disciplinary layoff, or discharge of an employee must be
based on evidence that is clear and must be occasioned by a substantial, not merely
technical, commission of a wrongful act and that full reason for such warning, suspension or discharge shall be recorded and stated in writing to the Union. Causes for
immediate discharge are: [list of ten causes, including "gross insubordination," endangering the workplace by violating safety rules, felony conviction, leaving the
premises during working time without permission, "deliberate destruction or removal" of company property, and fighting] .... Causes for warning, suspension and
ultimate discharge are: [list of ten causes, including "inefficient work of ... low
standard," "bringing or having intoxicants" on company premises, abusing intoxicants or reporting for work while intoxicated, unexcused absence or tardiness, and
"running, scuffling, horseplay or throwing things."]
DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION 53637 (2d ed. 1979) (excerpt from agreement between National Carbon Coated Paper Co. and
Local 1032, United Papermakers and Paperworkers).
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regulations. 13

protection in their
Courts in most states, including California, have held that implied
contract terms may limit an employer's power to discharge an employee
at will. 14 Forty-one United States jurisdictions now recognize implied
contract exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.1 5 Implied contract
terms may be ascertained from factors "including 'the personnel policies
or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service, actions
or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued
employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is
engaged.' "16 Courts have held that "such implied-in-fact contract terms
ordinarily stand on equal footing with express terms." 17 Thus, an employee may be protected from dismissal without cause either by an express contractual provision or by terms implied by the conduct of
employer and employee.
Part II of this Note examines the amount of protection afforded by a
just-cause clause when an employer wants to discharge an employee
based on allegations of misconduct that the employee denies. The view
that just cause requires only that the employer act in good faith, or reasonably and in good faith, is discussed in Part II.A. The notion that an
employer should have greater latitude in safety-sensitive situations is discussed in Part II.B. The view that just cause requires an employer to
prove actual misconduct by the employee is examined in Part II.C. Part
III addresses the policy considerations that are relevant to deciding
which of the alternatives examined in Part II should be incorporated into
a common-law just-cause standard, and concludes that when an employer discharges a just-cause protected employee based on disputed allegations of misconduct, the definition of just cause should include a
requirement that the employer's decision to discharge be reasonable, in
13. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7513 (1988 & Supp. II
1990); PERRITr, supra note 9, at 15-16.

14. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 384 (Cal. 1988); Toussaint v.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980). But cf Sabetay v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1987) (finding employer policy manual did not limit
employer's right to terminate at will).
15. PERRI-In, supra note 9, §§ 1.12-1.63 (summarizing implied contract cases state-by-

state).
16.

Foley, 765 P.2d at 387 (quoting Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925

(Ct. App. 1981)). One common way in which employees may receive protection from at-will

termination is through provisions in company-written and -distributed employee handbooks.
See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (Wash. 1984); Toussaint,
292 N.W.2d at 892 (holding employer's statements of policy may give rise to contractual rights
in employees); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that personnel handbook provisions may be enforceable as part of an employment
contract).
17. Foley, 765 P.2d at 385; see also Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885 (for-cause provision
may become part of the contract "either by express agreement or as a result of employee's
legitimate expectations grounded in employer's policy statements").

JUST CAUSE FOR TERMINATION

January 1993]

good faith, and based on substantial evidence. As Part III explains,
courts could also justifiably require a showing that the misconduct actually occurred, but given a substantial evidence requirement, this would
affect only a very small number of the cases in which disputed allegations
of misconduct are at issue.
II.

Theories of the Meaning of Just Cause

The issue of how much latitude an employer has, or should have, in
deciding whether to terminate a just-cause protected employee suspected
of misconduct has long been addressed within collective bargaining
agreements and civil service regulations, as well as by many courts, commentators, and arbitrators.
There are two primary rationales for not requiring an employer to
prove actual misconduct before discharging a just-cause protected employee. One is that such decisions are properly the province of the employer; the other is that workplace safety considerations may make it
desirable, if not imperative, for an employer to have flexibility in deciding
whether to discharge a suspect employee. While there is, or can be, overlap between these rationales, they will be considered separately in this
Note.
A. Relying on the Employer's Judgment and Good Faith
One school of thought holds that just cause should be interpreted in
harmony with a policy of great deference to the employer's decisionmaking. Under this theory, an employer who has promised just-cause protection to an employee has not breached that promise in terminating the
employee so long as the employer acts in good faith. In this context, an
employer acts in "good faith" when she believes that the employee's conduct provides sufficient grounds for discharge and is not using the alleged
misconduct as a pretext for discharge on some other ground. Many
18
courts would add the requirement that the employer act reasonably.
19
Several states have adopted this deferential approach.
18. See infra Part II.A.2.
19. See, e.g., Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 643 P.2d 1276, 1278-79 (Or. 1982)
(court will defer to "management decisional prerogative" to determine whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, absent agreement to transfer prerogative to another arbiter);
Shebar v. Sanyo Business Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1988); Vitale v. Bally's Park Place,
Inc., No. A-228-88T5, 1989 WL 284539, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 1989) (justcause provision in personnel manual requires employer to make good faith determination that
had credible support). Some courts, while stating a policy of deference to employers' decisions, would require an employer to base a for-cause discharge on substantial evidence. See,
e.g., Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280, 287 (N.M. 1988) (good cause dismissal requires that employer have objectively reasonable grounds to believe that sufficient cause existed
to justify termination), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in
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(1) Deference to the Employer
A leading case advocating deference to the employer's decisionmaking in just-cause termination is Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp.20 In
Simpson, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a lower court's finding that
the plaintiffs, who were discharged for allegedly threatening violence
against a co-worker, had been discharged for just cause. 2 1 The Oregon
Supreme Court held that when an employer has unilaterally granted justcause protection 22 to an employee, the employer retains its "fact-finding
prerogative" (the right to make the ultimate factual determination) in the
absence of any evidence of an express or implied agreement to the contrary. 23 Thus, when reviewing an employer's decision to discharge a justcause protected employee, a court need only find that the employer based
its decision on a determination that there were facts constituting just
cause for discharge. The court need not, however, find that those facts
actually existed. 24 The Simpson court arrived at this result by positing
that a just-cause provision "suggests two distinct questions: 1) what is
the meaning of just cause; and 2) who makes the requisite factual
25
determination.
It could be argued, however, that these two questions are not distinct. Whether the employer or an independent factfinder such as a court
or arbitrator makes the factual determination is really just a part of the
meaning of just cause. The nature and magnitude of the cause (e.g., be26
ing late for work regularly, or embezzling money from the company),
or what an employer must show in order to justify a dismissal of a protected employee, is also integral in determining how much protection an
employee has from arbitrary termination. A more precise way of stating
the issue, synthesized from several cases and commentaries, 27 is to anaWash. Inc., 769 P.2d 298, 304 (Wash. 1989) (just-cause discharge must be based on facts
supported by substantial evidence).
20. 643 P.2d 1276 (Or. 1982).
21. Id. at 1279.
22. In this case, both parties agreed that Western Graphics Corporation had granted justcause protection to its employees through terms of its employee handbook. Id. at 1278.
23. Id. at 1279.
24. Id. at 1278.
25. Id. A more recent intermediate court decision in Oregon held that an employer does
not have a unilateral right to decide what just cause means in the absence of specific contract
language giving the employer that right. Fleming v. Kids & Kin Head Start, 693 P.2d 1363,
1366 (Or. App. 1985).
26. See Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 197 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2014 (1991).
27. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896 (Mich. 1980); Sanders, 911 F.2d at 196-97 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 930 (Ct. App. 1981); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Ct. App.
1983) (balancing employee's contractual right to "good cause" protection against employer's
interest in operating business efficiently and in compliance with the law); Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510 (1989); cf.PER-
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lyze just-cause disputes by using a two-part test. The first question is
whether the employer or an independent factfinder makes the ultimate
factual determination of the employee's "guilt" or "innocence." If the
appropriate factfinder has determined that the employee has committed
some misconduct, the second inquiry is whether that misconduct is sufficient in nature to warrant discharge for cause.
Simpson and this Note address the first part of this test. The Simpson court's holding does not require an employer to meet an objective
standard for the reasonableness of its termination decision. As discussed
below, this means that employees who dispute the stated reasons for their
discharge have substantially less just-cause protection than they would
under a rule requiring employers to meet an objective standard when
discharging employees for cause.
(2) Holding the Employer to an Objective Standard
A more stringent standard for employers was set forth by the Washington Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington,
Inc.2 8 The employer in Baldwin, a hospital, had discharged an employee
based on allegations that the employee sexually assaulted a patient. The
trial court instructed the jury that "'just cause' means that under the
facts and circumstances existing at the time the decision is made, an employer had a good, substantial and legitimate business reason for terminating the employment of a particular employee."' 29 The jury then found
for the plaintiff-employee. 30 The Washington Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "[a] discharge for 'just cause' is one which is not for any
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason and which is one based on facts (1)
supported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed by the em'3 1
ployer to be true."
The Baldwin standard is comparable, at least on paper, to a test
frequently employed by arbitrators in interpreting the just-cause clauses
of collective bargaining agreements. 32 This seven-part test, developed by
arbitrator Carroll R. Daugherty, requires fair investigation and "substanRITr, supra note 9, §§ 4.49-4.51 (explaining that in each case of dismissal for good cause two
distinct questions are addressed).
28. 769 P.2d 298 (Wash. 1989).
29. Id. at 300.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 304. Another important ground for reversal was that the trial court instructed
the jury that the employer-defendants had the burden of persuasion on the issue of just cause.
The state supreme court held that, although the employer has the burden of production, the
burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff-employee at all times. Id. at 301-02; cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (shifting burdens of production
and persuasion in employment discrimination actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (same).
32. See Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb.(BNA) 359 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.); Grief
Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.).
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tial evidence or proof that the employee was guilty as charged. '33 In
practice, however, it seems that this requires proof of actual cause in
nearly all cases. 34 Daugherty's test is frequently cited in cases in which
35
the employee's conduct is in dispute.
The recently proposed Model Employment Termination Act includes a definition of just cause that requires the employer to act reasonably, but does not impose the Baldwin requirement of substantial
evidence. 36 The comments to the relevant section of the Act suggest,
however, that courts should look to the body of decisions on just cause
developed by labor arbitrators interpreting collective bargaining agreements. 37 If this suggestion is followed, the likely effect would be that
employers would be required to demonstrate, at a minimum, that for38
cause discharge decisions were based on substantial evidence.
Both the Baldwin and Simpson courts reasoned that the termination
decision is properly left to the employer, rather than the court. 39 While
it would undoubtedly be bad public policy to leave personnel decisions in
the hands of the courts, 40 a good-faith-only rule would reduce a promise
not to terminate except for just cause to a promise not to terminate in
bad faith. This is arguably inconsistent with the expectation of employ41
ers and employees as to the meaning and effect of just-cause provisions.
On this point, the Baldwin rule provides substantially more protection for the employee, because it holds the employer to an objective standard of reasonable conduct based on substantial evidence. The
requirement of substantial evidence is particularly important because it
protects employees from an employer who would argue that exigent circumstances, such as immediacy or safety considerations, required the
employer to act before accumulating substantial evidence.
33.
34.
35.

Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. at 364.
See ADOLPH M. KOVEN ET AL., JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS 237 (2d ed. 1992).
Id. at 24-26 (citing numerous cases).

36.

MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT § 1(4)(i) (1991):

1) "Good cause" means:
(i) a reasonable basis related to an individual employee for termination of the

employee's employment in view of relevant factors and circumstances, which may
include the employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct on the job or otherwise, job
performance, and employment record ....

37. Id. § 1(4) cmt. to Para. (4).
38. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
39. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash. Inc., 769 P.2d 298, 304 (Wash. 1989);
Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 643 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Or. 1982).
40. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976).
41. See Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991). Judge Reinhardt's concern was that a
good-faith-only rule would make the worker's actual conduct irrelevant, and thus make a
promise not to terminate except for cause equally irrelevant. Id.; see also Simpson, 643 P.2d at
1279 (Lent, J., dissenting).
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One could argue that the "reasonableness" requirement means that
an employer must demonstrate a reasonable decisionmaking process.4 2
This might well require a pretermination hearing of some sort. A reasonable decisionmaking process should certainly require something more
than an on-the-spot decision, especially when the evidence does not yield
an absolutely reliable conclusion.
In many cases, an employer has expressly or impliedly promised
that she will use specified procedures in making a discharge (or other
disciplinary) decision. Many states hold employers to their stated termination procedures even in an otherwise at-will employment relationship. 43 Professor Paul Weiler has suggested that an employer's
revocation of her stated termination process could be held unconscionable.44 Presumably, invalidating the revocation of the employer's stated
process might have the effect of making an employer liable in a wrongful
discharge action for failing to abide by her stated process. 45
B. Giving an Employer Greater Latitude in Safety-Sensitive Workplaces
Another rationale for not requiring the employer to prove actual
misconduct to the fact-finder in order to uphold a for-cause discharge is
that employers must have latitude, and indeed have an obligation, to protect their workplace and its surroundings from mishaps caused by dangerous workers. Strong public policy considerations support granting
management greater latitude with respect to safety as opposed to other
workplace concerns. Management has a public duty to ensure safety in
the workplace, but its interest in preventing embezzlement, for example,
is wholly private. Courts and legislatures would thus be acting in the
public interest, it could be argued, in giving employers more discretion to
carry out their obligations to the public at large.
This employer obligation to the public may collide with just-cause
protection when an employer believes a worker has committed misconduct that endangers the safe operation of the workplace. In addition to
the problem of deciding whether to dismiss an employee on less-than42. The meaning of "reasonable" in this context has apparently not been directly considered by reported court or arbitration decisions. It appears to have been an underlying issue in
the minds of the Ninth Circuit judges in Sanders. See 911 F.2d at 195 (opinion of the court, by
Trott, J.); id. at 200 n. 11(Reinhardt, J., concurring); id. at 215-17 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
43. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 890 (Mich. 1980) (holding that employer's policy manual established employee's contractual right "to be disciplined
and discharged only in accordance with the procedures there set forth"); Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d. 725, 735 (Ala. 1987); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that provisions in employee handbook may become part of contract); Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529-30 (Ct. App. 1984)
(employee has right to the benefit of rules and regulations adopted by company for employee's
protection).
44. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 54-55 (1990).
45. Id. at 53.
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certain evidence, an employer may be faced with the danger of leaving a
suspected employee on the job in a dangerous situation. This might occur in a situation such as that of Baldwin, in which a therapist working in
a hospital was suspected of sexually assaulting a patient in her hospital
room. A hospital that allowed such an employee to remain on the job
after receiving allegations of such misconduct might subject its patients
to an intolerable risk of harm and expose itself to massive civil liability.
This dilemma occurs more frequently when an employee in a safety-sensitive workplace is suspected of drug use, and the employer must decide
whether to discharge the employee based on scant evidence or to allow
the suspected employee to remain on the job.
In Sanders v. ParkerDrilling Co. ,46 three men who worked on an oil
rig on Alaska's North Slope were fired after their employer received,
from co-workers, allegations that indicated the men had smoked marijuana while working on the rig.47 The fired employees, who had justcause protection, denied the allegations and sued for wrongful discharge. 48 The United States District Court, applying Alaska law, instructed the jury that the just-cause provision required the employer to
prove that the plaintiffs had smoked marijuana on the rig.49 The jury
awarded the plaintiffs $360,000,50 finding in a special verdict that Parker
Drilling did not have just cause to dismiss.5 1 A divided Ninth Circuit
panel affirmed the verdict, holding that it was based on substantial evidence and that the trial court's instructions correctly applied Alaska
52
law.
Judge Kozinski vehemently dissented, calling the court's decision "a
' 53
result so preposterous it would be laughable if it were not so scary."
Kozinski argued that requiring employers to prove actual cause would
dangerously inhibit an employer's ability to remove suspected workers
from safety-sensitive positions:
Is this the type of decision we want to take out of the hands of management and give to a jury? Is it fair (or safe) to put company officials to a

choice between risking an environmental catastrophe and a crushing
jury verdict? It seems to me that the most we can reasonably ask of
managers under these difficult circumstances is that they act responsibly and in good faith. Whatever may be the rule when dealing with
employees who are not in safety-sensitive positions, it seems to me that
substantial deference is owed to managers who discharge employees
46.
47.

911 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 193.

48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 198 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

50. Gail Diane Cox, Just "Preposterous," NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20, 1990, at 6.
51. Sanders, 911 F.2d at 194.
52. Id. at 193-94.
53. Id. at 215 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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out of a legitimate, good-faith belief that54they are acting to preserve
life, limb, property and the environment.
In his call for "substantial deference" to managers in hazardous

workplaces, Judge Kozinski invoked an early implied contract just-cause
case, Pugh v. See's Candies,Inc.55 The Pugh court distinguished the determination of good cause in implied-contract cases from the determination of good cause when an employee has an express contract. 56 The
court then held that in implied-contract cases, "[c]are must be taken...
not to interfere with the legitimate exercise of managerial discretion ....
[W]here, as here, the employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must of necessity be allowed substantial
scope for the exercise of subjective judgment. '57 Kozinski suggested that
the reasoning of Pugh with respect to "sensitive managerial or confidential positions" should be applied to safety-sensitive positions in order to
provide managers with flexibility to ensure that58hazardous workplaces
can be kept free of possibly dangerous workers.
This rationale, however, must not be taken too far. Since this exception to just-cause protection is designed to keep dangerous workers out of
hazardous positions, it should apply only to forms of misconduct that are
potentially hazardous. An oil rig worker with just-cause protection
could, under this rationale, be terminated on suspicion of drug use; it
would, however, be silly to argue that safety considerations justify termination of the same worker on suspicion of falsifying an expense account
report.
One significant danger of the hazardous workplace exception is that
a "safety-sensitive" exception to the evidentiary requirement59 in the
just-cause standard could easily become the rule rather than the exception, resulting in the erosion or elimination of the protection of just-cause
provisions for innumerable workers. 60 Employers and courts could define myriad workplaces and occupations as sufficiently "safety-sensitive"
to justify suspension of employees' just-cause protection. The "safetysensitive" rationale has been used by employers and courts to justify random or mandatory drug testing for employees. In National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,61 the United States Supreme Court held
54. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
55. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981).
56. Id. at 928 (" 'Good cause' in this context is quite different from the standard applicable in determining the propriety of an employee's termination under a contract for a specified

term.").
57. Id. (citation omitted).
58. Sanders, 911 F.2d at 212 n.l1 (Koziaski, J., dissenting).
59. I would define "evidentiary requirement" here to mean what an employer must
demonstrate, whether it is proof of actual misconduct or substantial evidence thereof, to support a for-cause termination.
60. Sanders, 911 F.2d at 201-02 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
61. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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that mandatory drug testing for Customs Service employees satisfied the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement not only for employees
who were armed or involved in drug interdiction, but also for those who
handled "truly sensitive" information. 62 In one recent drug-testing case,
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the classification of nearly
30,000 of the 62,000 employees in the United States Department of
Transportation as "safety-sensitive. '63 Twenty different job classifications were included in the "safety-sensitive" category. 64
Both the "safety-sensitive exception" approach and the "deference"
approach discussed above are subject to the criticism, raised by Judge
Reinhardt, that when a worker has secured a promise to not be terminated unless she commits some misconduct, it would be a breach of this
promise to terminate her employment if she has not committed any misconduct. 65 As noted above, analysis of this point requires us to consider
both express and implied just-cause provisions.
The parties' intent and expectations are, or should typically be,
more apparent when considering an express promise not to terminate
except for cause. An employer that tells an employee, orally or in writing, "If you do your job and don't break company rules, you will not be
discharged," has, it would seem, promised that the employee will be discharged only if she actually breaks a rule, not if the employer suspects
she has broken a rule. Under these circumstances, a discharge on the
basis of the employer's mistaken suspicions would be a breach of
contract.
Analysis of this situation is not, however, as simple as it seems. Employers' promises, outside of collective bargaining agreements, 66 are not
likely to be explicit or crystal clear. Indeed, their vagueness may often be
62. Id. at 678. Justice Scalia, dissenting, sharply criticized the Court's decision and noted
that its rationale could easily be extended to subject vast numbers of public and private em-

ployees to the "needless indignity" of drug testing. Id. at 685-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 423 (1990). Many of the Department of Transportation positions not in
this category were classified as "sensitive" and subject to some drug testing, albeit in fewer
situations. Id.
64. Id. at 889. The purpose of the "safety-sensitive" classification was to allow the Department of Transportation to subject these workers to "random and periodic" drug testing.
Id. at 887. The D.C. Circuit upheld the testing program as constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard. Id. at 890-91.

65.

Id. at 196-97 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

66. Collective bargaining agreements are clearly a special case for several reasons. First,
there exists a lengthy written and negotiated agreement of which a just-cause clause is a part.
Second, courts and arbitrators interpret these agreements based on over fifty years of interpre-

tation of similar clauses in similar agreements between similar companies and similar unions in
similar industries-in short, "just cause" is not ill-defined in the collective bargaining setting.
Finally, the "terrain" is far different in a unionized setting, either private or public, than it is in
the nonunion private sector. (Just a few examples of relevant distinctive features in the unionized workplace: Mandatory, established grievance and arbitration proceedings; union repre-
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intentional, 67 and it is not unreasonable to suggest that only the public
policies enunciated by courts in recent years have put teeth into these
often vague assurances. Furthermore, the distinction between express
and implied just-cause provisions is not one observed by courts that have
considered just-cause provisions, 68 or in the modem law of contracts gen-

erally. 69 Thus, the parties' intent will likely prove to be elusive, making
it difficult to determine precisely what employer X and employee Y intended at the inception of their employment relationship.
Although this task is difficult in individual cases, it should be possible to define broadly a general "intent of the parties" regarding just-cause
70
provisions and to couple this with an analysis of policy considerations
in order to enunciate a rule that will apply to all just-cause cases in which
the meaning of the provision is not clearly and explicitly spelled out. A
good place to begin is with the long-standing assumption in contract law
that parties intend each substantive promise to have "business efficacy."' 71 To this may be added the public policy considerations that inform, or should inform, judicial interpretation of the employment
relationship. 72 An articulate synthesis of these principles may be found
in the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion in Toussaint v. Blue Cross &

Blue Shield:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them known to its employees, the employment
relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of
mind associated with job security and the conviction that he will be
treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations need take place and
the parties' minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it matter that
the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer's polisentation of any worker with a grievance; and the common use of reinstatement as a remedy
for wrongly terminated workers.) See WEltER, supra note 44, at 48-55.
In his concurrence in Sanders, Judge Reinhardt analyzed just-cause protection while making little distinction between its effect in the unionized workplace and its'effect in the nonunion, private-sector workplace. 911 F.2d at 196-204 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). This confuses
the issue. Actually, one might argue that because the nonunion, private-sector employee lacks
the protections against arbitrary treatment enjoyed by union employees, the common-law standard for just cause should be more protective of employee rights than the collective bargaining
standard.
67. See PERRr, supra note 9, §§ 7.17-7.18.
68. No court in any of the states that recognize implied-contract exceptions to the at-will
employment rule has made a distinction between the enforceability of implied and express
provisions. See, eg., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d at 385 (holding that implied
and express contractual provisions in employment relationships "stand on equal footing").
69. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) or CONTRACTS §§ 4 cmt. a, 19 cmt. a (1979).
70. See infra Part III.
71. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214-15 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo,
J.).
72. See infra Part III.
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cies and practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally.
It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest,
to create an environment in which the employee believes that,
whatever the personnel policies and practices, they are established and
official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each employee. The
employer has then created
' 73
a situation "instinct with an obligation."
This leads naturally into a discussion of the rule for a just-cause
evidentiary standard enunciated in the Toussaint case, which requires an
employer to demonstrate actual cause in order to support a for-cause
termination.
C. Requiring Actual Cause to Discharge a Protected Employee
The rationale behind requiring actual misconduct before a just-cause
protected employee may be lawfully discharged is that this is what the
employee has been promised-that she will be terminated only if she has
committed some wrongdoing. Under this standard, in addition to having
actual cause, the employer must act in good faith and must not use the
purported actual cause as a pretext for unlawful discrimination 74 or any
other insufficient cause, 75 and must act equitably (i.e., may not selectively
76
enforce its work rules).
A leading case establishing this rule is Toussaint v. Blue Cross &

Blue Shield.77 In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a

promise of continued employment absent cause for termination could be
implied from an employer's stated policies and established procedures. 78
The court went on to hold that "where an employer has agreed to discharge an employee for cause only, its declaration that the employee was
discharged for unsatisfactory work is subject to judicial review." '79
73. 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wood, 118 N.E. at
214).
74. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989) (sex, race, religion and national origin must be irrelevant to employment decisions, even if "legitimate" factors are also part of the motivation for the employer's decision); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (employer cannot use employee's misconduct as a pretext for
discriminatory discharge).
75. See, e.g., Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 895-96; Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524,
533 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that employer, in bad faith, used an untrue actual cause to legitimize the termination of an employee; employer was thus liable for wrongful discharge).
76. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 897.
77. Id. at 895-97.
78. Id. at 885, 890.
79. Id. at 895. At the end of its opinion, the court held that "the employer can avoid the
perils of jury assessment by providing for an alternative method of dispute resolution" such as
binding arbitration. Id. at 897.
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The courts of several states, including California, are in accord with
this rule. In Wilkerson v. Wells FargoBank,80 the California Court of
Appeal explicitly framed the issue in terms of breach of contract:
[Ain employer's subjective belief it possessed good cause does not dispose of a wrongfully discharged employee's claim for breach of contract. Such employee is entitled to recover for breach of contract
notwithstanding the employer's state of mind.
...

If an employer claims that the employee was discharged for

specific misconduct, and the employee denies the charge, the question
81
of whether the misconduct occurred is one of fact for the jury.
The California Supreme Court has implied its approval of the Wilkerson
rule by remanding a contrary court of appeal decision for reconsideration
82
in light of Wilkerson.
Civil service regulations for federal employees also require a showing of actual cause for discharge. The Federal Civil Service Reform Act
of 197883 guarantees procedural steps and requires a nexus between misconduct and "efficiency of the [civil] service" for removal, demotion, or
suspension of federal employees. 84 Under the Act, judicial review is
based only on reasonableness of the agency's and the Merit Systems Protection Board's decisions. 85 Most state civil service regulations are simi86
lar, providing for scrutiny of discharge decisions by a review board.
Most public employees are covered by civil service termination
87
procedures.
Courts that have proposed an actual-cause requirement for justcause provisions in nonunion, private-sector workplaces 88 argue that
anything less would severely weaken the promised just-cause protection.
80. 261 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1989).
81. Id. at 192-93.
82. Lagoe v. Duber Indus. See., Inc., 782 P.2d 1140, 1140 (Cal. 1989); see also McLain v.
Great Am. Ins., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869-70 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming jury verdict that employee did not in fact violate the company rules as alleged by employer, and thus employer
breached implied contract to not terminate employee except for cause).
83. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7521, 7701-7703 (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. 11 1990).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1988).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1988 & Supp. I 1989). The courts will affirm rational decisions to
dismiss federal employees if applicable procedures were followed and substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. Risner v. FAA, 677 F.2d 36, 37-38 (8th Cir. 1982); Beard v. GSA,
801 F.2d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Jones v. Farm Credit Admin., 702 F.2d 160, 162 (8th
Cir.), cert denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983).
86. PERRrrr, supra note 9, § 6.5.
87. Id. Non-civil-service or at-will public employees are guaranteed minimal due process
protections (notice and a hearing) if covered by the U.S. Supreme Court's property or liberty
interest decisions. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39, 547 n.13
(1985); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-603 (1972); Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74, 578 (1972).
88. For a discussion of the distinction between union and nonunion workplaces, see supra
note 66.
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The Toussaint court stated that its requirement of judicial review is necessary because
[a] promise to terminate employment for cause only would be illusory
if the employer were permitted to be the sole judge and final arbiter of
the propriety of the discharge. There must be some review of the employer's decision if the
cause contract is to be distinguished from the
89
satisfaction contract.
Judge Reinhardt's concurrence in Sanders v. ParkerDrilling expressed a
similar sentiment in criticizing Judge Kozinski's position 90 that an employer should, at least in hazardous workplaces, have substantial discretion to discharge a just-cause protected employee:
Were the dissent to prevail, the focus in employment law in this
country would be drastically altered: the focus would no longer be on
whether a violation of company policy actually occurred; it would
shift entirely to an examination of the employer's subjective state of
mind. [The protection of just-cause provisions] would disappear, to be
replaced by the posing, in all potential discharge cases, of a single, radically different question: Was a supervisor's erroneous belief that an
employee violated company policy held in good faith? The actual facts
of the case would become insignificant--only the employer's mental
state would matter.9 1
Judge Reinhardt also emphasized the breach-of-contract rationale for
this rule:
It is elementary that "just cause" for discharge means that the employer must show that the employee committed an act which warrants
his discharge. The employer must have a sound basis-a reasonable
ground-for his decision to terminate the employee. But the employer
does not have a reasonable ground if the beliefs or assumptions on
which he bases his decision are incorrect. If the employer cannot
prove that the employee engaged in some misconduct which constitutes cause for discharge, he does not have just cause for firing the
employee. It is simply not enough for an employer to show that he was
well intentioned, that his heart was pure or that if the employee
92 had
committed an improper act he would be free to discharge him.
Enforcement of an "actual cause" rule necessarily contemplates
some review of the employer's decision to discharge, whether it is by a
court, an arbitrator, or a hearing board. 93 Thus, one must consider
whether it would be unworkable to have an independent factfinder second-guess termination decisions on a large scale. 94 Judge Kozinski's dissent in Sanders attacks the actual-cause rule on this basis:
89. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Mich. 1980).
90. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
91. Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 196 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991).
92. Id. at 197 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
93. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 895-97.
94. See PERRITr, supra note 9, § 4.51 (criticizing the decision of the Ninth Circuit panel
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If... we adopt the Toussaint rule [requiring employers to prove actual
cause], state and federal courts will soon be in the business of reviewing employment discharge decisions on a wholesale basis. Given the
number of jobs where, arguably, the employer has adopted a just cause
Systems Protection Boards
requirement, the courts will become Merit
95
for all private employment relationships.

The rule might also be criticized as dangerous, as discussed above, if it
potentially hazardous employees
prevents employers from removing
96
from a safety-sensitive position.
The unworkability concerns may be overstated. Obviously, not all
disputed discharges result in litigation, regardless of the law or rule that
governs a particular situation. Any law results in some litigation; the
question is: What is an appropriate amount of litigation generated by
this rule? It does not appear that the law, as it stands today in California, 97 for example, has generated an avalanche of litigation. 98 Furthermore, the Model Employment Termination Act proposes the use of
arbitration in adjudicating wrongful discharge disputes; 99 if such a system were legislatively enacted and implemented, it might prove to be
quite workable. 100
More importantly, what will be the effect of the rule, and the large
or small potential for litigation, on real workplaces and real discharge
decisions? The most desirable rule is the one that best gives effect to the
employer's promise to terminate only for cause without imposing an unwarranted burden on the legal system. When evaluating the actual-cause
requirement, the relevant inquiry is whether the rule is necessary to enin Sanders as unworkable). Of course, Perritt's criticism assumes that a jury would necessarily
be the independent fact-finder.
95. Sanders, 911 F.2d at 211 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski, incidentally,
previously served on the Merit Systems Protection Board for the federal civil service system.
96. See id. at 204-05 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
98. Unfortunately, the most recent studies of wrongful discharge litigation in California
covered only cases preceding the state supreme court's decision in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (1988), which radically altered the California wrongful-discharge landscape. Since Foley, this landscape has been further altered by the supreme court's expansion of
the public-policy exception to the bar on recovery of punitive damages in wrongful-discharge
cases. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 388-90 (Cal. 1990) (holding that there is a fundamental public policy against harassment and discrimination, allowing plaintiff alleging sexual harassment and discrimination to state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy).
99. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT §§ 5, 6 (1991).
100. Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act provides that parties may resolve their dispute by final and binding arbitration if they sign a written agreement to that
effect and follow the procedures enumerated in the Act. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(1)
(1989). If one party offers to arbitrate and the other declines, the offering party, should she
prevail in a legal action under the Act, is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees incurred subsequent to the date of the offer. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(4) (1989).
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sure that employers will honor their promise not to terminate without
cause.
III.

Sorting Through the Options

In deciding which rule is preferable, several factors should be considered. These include the need to give effect to the just-cause protection
itself, the potential costs of any rule, and whether to defer to managerial
decisions, either as a matter of general policy or for workplace safety
considerations.
If just-cause promises are to have any substance at all, it is clear that
the just-cause standard must be objective. A subjective standard would
reduce a promise to terminate only for cause to a promise not to terminate only if the employer is subjectively satisfied, as noted by the Toussaint court. 10 1
Thus a "good-faith-only" standard, under which an employer would
only have to act in good faith in discharging "for cause," is clearly inadequate. Whether or not courts should defer to the employer's decision, as
the Simpson court advocated, 102 employers must act according to an objective, measurable standard. The minimum objective requirement is
that an employer act reasonably and in good faith.
What is "reasonable" in this context, however, is not well defined at
this point, as noted above. 10 3 Clearly, reasonableness would require a
rational determination, based on facts and circumstances. Some sort of
process-investigation, consultation among management personnel, a
hearing, or other aspects-should be expected from a "reasonable" employer who has promised a worker not to discharge her without cause.
A requirement of "reasonableness," without more, might be both a
virtue and a vice. It would have the advantage of giving a manager some
discretion in exigent circumstances; if a situation required a prompt decision, one could argue, it might be reasonable to make a less considered
decision than the employer would otherwise make. 14 This would allow
101. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895-96 (Mich. 1980).
102. Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 643 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Or. 1982).
103. See supra Part II.A.
104. Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 215 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991):
To wait any longer or look any closer would have been reckless; the dangers being
what they were, the company had no responsible choice but to act decisively. By
affirming the jury verdict against Parker, we are saying that management erred
grievously by failing to send the employees back onto the oil rig after receiving three
eyewitness reports that they were observed regularly abusing drugs on the job, and
that the company must now pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for its mistake.
This strikes me as a result so preposterous it would be laughable if it were not so
scary.
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an employer to avoid keeping a suspected worker in a hazardous position
when it would be reckless to do so. 10 5
The vice of a "reasonableness" standard, without more, is the uncertainty of what is required. Allowing a jury to determine what is reasonable, in the largely uncharted waters of wrongful termination litigation,
might result in wildly different results.1 0 6 This would lead to widespread
uncertainty among employers and employees with regard to what is required. As with the "workability" issue, however, a legislatively-enacted
regime of arbitration would greatly ameliorate this concern.
Adding a substantial evidence requirement provides more definition
to the reasonableness standard. Viewed in the context of requiring both
reasonableness and substantial supporting evidence, "reasonable" decisionmaking can be seen to include careful consideration of substantial
evidence-i.e., a discharge decision based on substantial evidence is presumptively reasonable, and failure to base such a decision on substantial
evidence makes that decision presumptively unreasonable. The substantial evidence requirement would not make a reasonableness requirement
redundant, however; a reasonable discharge decision would still have to
include consideration and procedure appropriate to the circumstances
surrounding the discharge, as noted above, in addition to a basis in substantial evidence.
The Baldwin rule, 10 7 which requires any discharge of a just-cause
protected employee to be reasonable, in good faith, and based on substantial evidence, would provide certainty while still conceding that the ultimate decision should be in the hands of the employer. There would,
however, be a significant and desirable check on the employer's discretion in the substantial evidence requirement. This requirement would
allow the employer to make the ultimate decision only if that decision is
clearly reasonable-i.e., not so arguably unreasonable as to allow the dis10 8
charged employee to state a cause of action.
The plaintiff's burden of proof is an important issue to consider in
deciding how best to ensure the adequacy of just-cause protection. It
may be the most important practical effect of whichever rule applies.' 0 9
If an employee-plaintiff can survive a defendant's motion for summary
judgment, she has a very good chance of getting a settlement or a
favorable jury verdict."10
105. Id.
106. This contrasts with allowing a jury to determine what is "reasonable" conduct in, for
example, a personal injury lawsuit involving a minor automobile accident.
107. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 769 P.2d 298, 304 (Wash. 1989).
108. In a sense, then, when the employer's conduct is unreasonable or at least questionable, the employer forfeits her right to be the ultimate fact-finder in the case.
109. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
110. From 1982 through 1986, plaintiffs in wrongful discharge cases in California that
went to trial won nearly 75% of the time. William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as
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Thus, the Baldwin rule is, from the employee's point of view, a vast
improvement over a simple reasonableness rule. The substantial evidence requirement would allow many plaintiffs to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, since they would only have to show a genuine issue
of fact as to whether or not the employer's decision was based on substantial evidence.
Typically, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of wrongful
discharge, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to prove
that the discharge was in fact lawful."' Clearly, the Simpson rule 1 2 provides employers with a substantially smaller, if not almost trivial, burden
13
of production compared to the Baldwin or Toussaint rules.'
Would there be much of a practical, real-world difference, in most
cases, between the Baldwin and Toussaint rules? 1 4 Probably not, especially if we assume that the crucial effect on litigation comes at the summary judgment stage. Either rule would make it more likely for a
plaintiff to defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment than
would a good-faith-only or good-faith-plus-simple-reasonableness rule.
The most noticeable difference would occur at the trial stage in very close
cases. The number of such cases relative to the number of private-sector
employees protected by a just-cause provision is surely very small.
The only significant difference between the Baldwin rule and the
Toussaint rule appears when an employer, having substantial evidence
that an employee has committed misconduct that would justify a discharge for cause, determines that the employee did commit the misconduct. Under the Baldwin rule, a discharge in this case would not be
wrongful, whether or not the employee actually committed any wrongdoing. 1 5 Under the Toussaint rule, if the employee did not actually
commit the misconduct, the discharge would be16 wrongful, since there
would have been no actual cause for discharge."
Thus, the difference is that Toussaint imposes strict liability on an
employer in this type of case if there is no actual cause for discharge. If
this "strict liability case" is to apply at all, it would make sense to limit it
Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 885, 905.
111. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Ct. App. 1981). The
ultimate burden of proof, however, remains on the plaintiff. See Cleary v. American Airlines,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Ct. App. 1980).
112. Under the Simpson rule, the court will defer to the employer's decision absent an
express provision in the employment relationship to the contrary. Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 643 P.2d 1276, 1278-79 (Or. 1982).
113. Both decisions require that the employer present evidence of actual employee misconduct to establish just cause. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., 769 P.2d 298, 304
(Wash. 1989); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Mich. 1980).
114. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
115. See Baldwin, 769 P.2d at 304.
116. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
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to situations in which an employee has been expressly promised that she

will not be terminated unless she commits some misconduct. 11 7 This is
really just a non-negligent breach of contract. If A promises to pay B in
exchange for B's promise to paint A's house, for example, and B fails to
paint the house, B has breached even if B's failure is not negligent, reck-

less, or intentional, assuming B has no legally valid excuse for nonperformance. Thus, "strict liability" here is really only an application of
ordinary principles of contract law.
If we were to closely examine the Toussaint rule, we might consider
whether the damages available in cases in which the employer has acted
negligently, recklessly, or intentionally should also be available in strictliability cases. One possible variation would be to limit recovery in cases
in which employers, for policy reasons, should have "substantial scope"
118
or latitude to discharge a suspect employee.
While a discussion of available damages is beyond the scope of this
Note, numerous commentators have discussed whether compensatory
(pain and suffering) or punitive damages or attorney's fees should be recoverable in wrongful discharge cases. 119 The trend appears to be disfavoring punitive damages, but favoring recovery of attorney's fees.1 20 In
California, recovery of punitive damages in breach of employment con121
tract cases is not allowed, unless there is a violation of public policy.
Most states appear to be in accord with California on the issue of punitive damages.12 2 Certainly, limiting recovery in "strict liability cases"
beyond this would, for almost all employees, render the remedy not
worth the trouble.123
117. But see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 386 (Cal. 1988) (implied-in
fact contract terms ordinarily stand on equal footing with express terms). When the implied
term is something like, "employee will not be discharged without just cause," however, there is
no reason to assume that the implied term "just cause" will be further interpreted consistently
with Toussaint rather than Baldwin. If the implied term is "employee will not be discharged
without actual cause," then the Foley rule would require just such an interpretation consistent
with Toussaint, which is entirely reasonable.
118. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (Ct. App. 1981); Sanders v.
Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 212 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991).
119. See, eg., WEILER, supra note 44, at 78-81.
120. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT § 7(b) (1991); Montana Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 39-2-904 to 39-2-914 (1989).
121. Foley, 765 P.2d at 395-97.
122. See PERRrrr,supra note 9, § 4.28; 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at 569:12-13
(1991); id. No. 76, at 505:344 (1991); id. No. 33. at 505:608 (1988); see also, Gaglidari v.
Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 815 P.2d 1362, 1370-75 (Wash. 1991) (refusing to grant employee
damages for emotional distress, but allowing attorney's fees and lost wages).
123. If the only available damages for a strict liability cause of action were back pay, the
remedy would prove illusory for virtually every employee. At the very least, attorney's fees
would have to be provided along with back pay. Even so, if the contract principle of mitigation applied, most awards would be reduced to a vanishingly small amount. Several commen-
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Conclusion
To ensure that just-cause protection for workers is meaningful, an
employer must be required to satisfy an objective standard in discharging
an employee for cause. An employee who has been promised that she
will not be discharged without cause should at the very least be assured
that she will not lose her job unless her employer has substantial evidence
that she has committed some wrongdoing. Both the Baldwin rule and
the Toussaint rule provide just cause with the necessary substance. The
complete parallel with breach of contract cases that Toussaint provides is
academically appealing; the vast majority of employees protected by justcause provisions would, however, notice no difference in effect between
the two rules.

tators have noted the dilemma facing employee-plaintiffs whose potential recovery is limited.
See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 5, at 140.

